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Chapter 25
International investment arbitration: winning, losing and why
*

Susan D. Franck

We know several things about foreign investment. First, foreign investment matters,
reaching US$ 1.7 trillion in 2008. Second, we know that foreign investors have new
international law rights to protect their economic interests. Third, we know that those
rights are now being used. So since we now know that the international legal risk is not
illusory, the real questions are: who wins, who loses and why? While various
commentators have asserted a variety of answers to those questions, many have done so
without reference to valid and reliable data.89 In its most benign form, these observations
create misinformation, but perhaps more troublingly, might also lead to policy choices
based upon unrepresentative anecdotal evidence, supposition or political rhetoric. To help
alleviate these possible outcomes, this Chapter reviews recent empirical research90 in
order to provide basic information to fundamental questions about investment treaty
arbitration (ITA) to create a more accurate framework for policy choices and disputeresolution strategies.
So who does win and lose international investment treaty arbitration? The answer is: both
foreign investors and host states win and lose.91 The data suggest, however, that they lose
in reasonably equivalent proportions. Not including the disputes that ended with an award
embodying a settlement, respondent governments, for example, won approximately 58%
of the time. Meanwhile, investors won 39% of the cases.92
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Winning and losing, however, is not just about whether there is a breach of the
underlying investment treaty. The amount awarded is also critical. Despite the fact that
investors claimed US$ 343 million in damages on average, that is not what they received.
Rather, tribunals awarded investors only US$ 10 million on average. This US$ 333
million difference is not insubstantial, and it may give investors a basis for some
reflection about the value of arbitration – particularly given the need to pay the arbitral
tribunal and the other legal costs associated with bringing a claim.93
Knowing which parties actually win and lose begs a further question – namely: why are
parties successful? This question is critical given suggestions that ITA is potentially
biased.94 There has been some debate about whether respondents’ development status or
whether arbitrators come from the developing world improperly affects outcome. If these
development variables cause particular results, this would raise issues about the integrity
of investment treaties and arbitration.
To address this critical issue, recent research considered whether there was a reliable
statistical link between the level of development and ITA outcomes. The results suggest
that development variables did not generally cause particular outcomes. One study found
that there was no relationship between a government’s level of development and the
outcome of ITA.95 A second study then showed that – at a general level – outcome was
not reliably associated with the development status of the respondent, the development
status of the presiding arbitrator, or some interaction between those two variables. This
held true for both: (1) winning or losing investment treaty arbitration, and (2) amounts
tribunals awarded against governments. Follow-up tests in the same study showed,
however, that there were two statistically significant effects – found in one sub-set of
potentially non-representative cases – that suggest arbitration must be used carefully in
certain situations. Only where the presiding arbitrator was from a middle income country,
the data showed that high income countries received statistically lower awards than: (1)
upper-middle income respondents, and (2) low income respondents. Nevertheless, in
other circumstances involving middle income presiding arbitrators or all cases involving
presiding arbitrators from high-income countries, the amounts awarded were statistically
equivalent.96 In other words, in limited circumstances, tribunals with presiding arbitrators
from middle-income countries made awards that tended to favor developed countries and
were different than one might expect from chance alone.
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The overall results cast doubt on the arguments that: (1) ITA is the equivalent of tossing a
two-headed coin to decide disputes, (2) the developing world is treated unfairly in ITA,
and (3) arbitrators from the developed and developing world decide cases differently. The
evidence creates a basis for cautious optimism about the integrity of ITA and suggests
radical overhaul, rejection or rebalancing of these procedural rights is not necessarily
warranted. While the follow-up tests and limitations of the data suggest optimism must be
tempered properly, a sensible approach would involve creating targeted solutions to
address particularized problems and enacting targeted reforms to redress perceived
concerns about the international investment regime.
Ultimately, the data suggest that investors and governments won and lost in relatively
equal measure, but governments won a bit more. While the data show also that, when
they did win, investors ended up with substantially less than they requested. Moreover,
the data do not establish that a respondent’s development status was a reason why
investors or governments were successful in pursuing arbitration. This suggests that why
a party wins or loses arbitration may ultimately have more to do with factors other than
development, such as the merits of a particular claim or defense. Other factors may also
be linked with outcome, such as the business sector involved, the amounts claimed or the
type of host state government, but they may not necessarily cause particular results. This
suggests that although there are risks in pursing arbitration, there will be times when it is
warranted and, ultimately, parties should think carefully about why arbitration is in their
interests.
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